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In the ten years since 2008, interest in the subject of crisis has increased worldwide, 
both among economists and historians. Economic theories were not able to forecast 
the most recent the global economic crisis, and the packages of measures based 
on economic science did not produce the expected results in many cases. Critics 
started to question the predictive power of theories and the applicability of theories 
to reality. However, it has become an increasingly widespread notion that the 
historical analysis of market structures, concepts and human behaviour patterns 
may add something to the explanatory power and practical applicability of theories. 
This is precisely the goal that György Kövér set for himself in his recently released 
work. Many have outlined that the history of crises is a history of amnesia and 
misunderstandings, and a historian can best help to improve the understanding of 
current developments by discussing the process of forgetting and the memories of 
crises. It is not the duty of a historian to offer new recipes for recovery, but it is to 
rethink the old ones drawing on the experience of current crises.
This is not the first time the author has dealt with this issue. In 1986, he published 
a monograph on the crisis of 1873, and later, in the context of the history of the 
Hungarian government debt in the age of the dual monarchy, he wrote about 
periodically returning financial crises. Between 2012 and 2017, he researched the 
economic, social and mentality history of the 19-20th century crises, in the MTA-
ELTE Crisis History Research Group as its leader. The book is the author’s own 
selection of studies, including previously published studies and studies written for 
this occasion, and pays tribute to this joint research encompassing a broad spectrum 
of crises from famine, floods and epidemics to agricultural, industrial, financial and 
commercial crises.
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The idea behind this selection, as the cohesive force of the book, is primarily 
the examination of Hungary’s 19th and 20th century crises from macro- and 
microeconomic perspectives. The first two introductory studies set the theoretical 
framework and are followed by seven papers described by the author as crisis 
stories with multiple scales of observation. The book ends with another two studies 
presenting perceptions and memories of crises.
The first part includes two essays which were published 30 years apart. The more 
recent study from 2015 entitled Crisis history as a discipline presents, in particular, 
the spread of the concept of crisis and crisis phenomena borrowed from medical 
terminology, and the approach of international (Max Wirth, Clément Juglar, 
Joseph Schumpeter) and Hungarian (Jakab Pólya, Tivadar Surányi-Unger) classical 
representatives of crisis history and crisis theory. The older work deals with the 
history of the Kondratiev cycle. The key conclusion of the study is that although 
long-term economic cycles have been construed and defined in many different ways 
throughout time, and a number of explanations, mainly monocausal explanations 
have been and are still being provided, their existence seems justified at least since 
the 18th century. Even though – in contrast to shorter commercial cycles – people 
cannot directly perceive them, they leave indelible memories which come to life 
over and over again.
The crisis stories are introduced by a macro-level analysis (“Nothing but crises”) 
presenting the existential and financial crises of the 19th century and their 
fluctuations: short-term financial and commercial cycles (Juglar), long-term economic 
cycles (Kondratiev), and century-long trends (Braudel’s secular trend-cycles). Standing 
at their intersection, the crisis of 1873 was exceptionally severe because it was 
interconnected with crises of various types (famine, cholera, financial-commercial, 
budgetary). However, the reason why it became known as the “Great Crash” by 
future generations is primarily the fact that it was followed by price drops for two 
decades in the descending phase of a long economic cycle. The study titled “From 
famine to stock market crash” also focuses on interconnected crises, highlighting 
the second half of the 1840s and the first half of the 1870s. The author illustrates 
the combined effect of cholera, famine and financial crisis using an extremely 
broad range of sources. The historian’s narrative is supported by demographic data, 
price trends, industrial production indexes in addition to bankruptcy statistics and 
contemporaneous commemorations. In respect of the famine of 1863, in an essay 
titled “Poverty around the corner” the author leads the reader from the perspective 
of global climate events through measures at different levels of Hungarian authorities 
into the personal fate of the local population of Tiszaeszlár. From the remaining 
data collection of national, county and local authorities, we gain an understanding 
not only of the crisis management process, but also the specific circumstances and 
intentions which led to the creation of historic sources.
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The Small Crisis ((1869) in the Shadow of the Great Crash (1873) points out that the 
historical judgement of the crisis of 1869 was dominated by the crisis four years 
later: most authors regarded the crisis of 1869 as a prelude and highlighted that 
actors did not learn from the mistakes. This is the image of the crisis in historical 
memory despite the fact that it showed completely different characteristics than the 
crisis of 1873: it was not international, and only hit the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
more specifically, Vienna and Budapest. It had no particular impact on the real 
economy in Hungary, and rural areas were hardly touched upon. The crisis was 
definitely due to foundation fever in the preceding years and excessive stock market 
speculation. Additionally, through a macro analysis and contemporary perceptions 
of the crisis, we can understand the financial crisis at micro level through the failure 
of private banker I. I. Kohner. The study “From fiscal crisis to gold annuity bond.” 
provides an insight into the secrets of the fiscal consolidation after the Great Crash. 
Kálmán Széll, as the speaker of the National Assembly’s financial committee and 
later as the secretary of the committee aiming at restoring the balance of budget 
and finally as Minister of Finance between 1875 and 1878, played a significant role 
in the preparation of state budgets before, during and after the crisis. From the 
sources related to his activity, we get to know the financial government’s objectives 
and their limited room for manoeuvre, while, in respect of debt consolidation, we 
learn that – independently from the constitutional system of the empire – financial 
markets assessed the two states as a whole.
In a study co-written with Károly Halmos (“Bankruptcy cases in Pest”), the 
author draws the attention to the importance of bankruptcy statistics as sources 
for economic history, and he emphasises that data can equally reflect changes 
in economic activity, statutory regulation and culture. For the 1850s, Austrian 
bankruptcy statistics are only available. For the 1860s and 1870s, the statistics of 
the municipal court of Pest called Pesti Városi Törvényszék (individual entrepreneurs 
and companies with industrial licenses) and the commercial court of Budapest 
called Budapesti Kereskedelmi és Váltótörvényszék (companies under commercial 
law), while from the 1880s, official statistics on companies deleted from the 
company registry provide sources for research. When assessing sources, it should 
be considered that the number of liquidations significantly surpassed the number 
of bankruptcies. Data show financial cycles with a certain time lag, however they 
reveal that individual and commercial companies were more strongly hit by the 
crisis than others, and in the second half of the 19th century, some 40 per cent 
of the companies were terminated within 30 years. The subject and title of the 
paper closing the work on crisis events is “The bankruptcy of a Lutheran wholesale 
trader in Pest”. Although Frigyes Frölich applied for bankruptcy protection in 1865, 
finally he reached a settlement with his creditors. Contemporary Menyhért Lónyay 
and a 20th-century historian, Vera Bácskai arrived at two different assessments of 
Frölich’s carrier and failure. According to the former, on the one hand, a Jew is only 
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able to survive among merchants in Pest, on the other hand, Frölich should have 
stuck to what he was professional in. According to the latter, the second generation 
of merchant families in Pest was characterised by a stronger entrepreneurial 
mindset and greater flexibility as against that of their fathers. Following a detailed 
presentation of the history of the family and their business, the author draws the 
conclusion based on an analysis of the bankruptcy proceeding and lists of assets 
and liabilities identified in the proceeding that Frölich’s failure was explicitly 
interconfessional: all major confessions were represented by the victims, and the 
“excessive expansion” into the field of railway construction cannot definitely be 
regarded either as the reason for bankruptcy. Maybe Frölich was just in the wrong 
place at the wrong time.
The first study of the chapter presenting the perceptions of crisis is titled Growth 
and decline in the historical memory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It 
demonstrates the memories of the economic fluctuations of the dualistic system, 
first through the eyes of contemporary actors, and then through the lens of 
economists and statisticians involved in researching history, and finally through 
historians’ constructions of the past. The author concludes that the reflections 
of contemporary scientists are not free from the impacts of personal experience 
and contemporary discourses, and historians’ retrospective constructions also have 
their own cycles. Their models reflect the prevailing approaches and concepts of 
their era. Contemporaries do not even perceive longer-term phenomena, and 
their perceptions relate to events of that time. Such contemporary perceptions 
are presented in the volume’s final study entitled Agony or resurrection? It analyses 
the failure of Simon Krausz, “Napoleon of the Pest stock exchange” in the 20th 
century, in 1929 – even before the outbreak of the Great Crisis – as well as the diary 
notes written by the failed Krausz between 1931 and 1934. From this essay, we get 
to know the resentful worldview of Krausz who was considered to be a financial 
genius by many, but a swindler and gambler by others. In this worldview, the black 
and white figures of the classes of people seen by Krausz in a positive or negative 
way are completely separated in just the same way his contemporaries saw him in 
black and white terms.
In his book, György Kövér wanted to analyse crises from economic, social and 
mentality history aspects, and the study volume perfectly achieves this aim. Both 
the structure of the volume and the various studies reflect this approach. The macro 
analysis of the economic history, the local impacts and the individual perceptions 
of the crises complement each other well in most studies, making the historian’s 
reasoning not only more easy-to-understand, but also more fascinating for the 
reader. The author’s methodological versatility, the use of extremely diverse and 
different sources make the book a highly multifaceted and readable publication in 
which meteorological, demographic and economic statistics data series, presented 
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in an understandable way, coexist comfortably, often within one study, with 
biographic, historic and mentality history parts. The title The burden of growth 
probably refers to the view that crises are always caused by preceding upturns 
during which not only do the bubbles – fittingly illustrated on the cover designed 
by Nóra Sós – blow up, but we tend to forget about the lessons learned from 
previous crises.
